The KRY shareholders had better organize and deal with a state of affairs that will make sure they will end with mere pennies on a dollar from the KRY saga.

 The first order of business needs to be to make sure the DIP loan and the Noteholders loans are paid "yesterday". By doing so, they will eliminate the need for bankrupcy protection and return the company to shareholders. Bankrupcy courts will alwyas side with the DIP lender and the Creditors on the assumption that any action approved by the company' management is in principle in the best interest of the shareholders, unless proven otherwise. Naturally, one of the first acts under bankruptcy is to have the court approve the suspension of the Shareholders' meeting and the publication of financial statements and decisions approved by the company to sideline the shareholders during the bankcrupcy proceedings. 

The second order of business is to clean up the the Board of Directors (BOD). The interests of the BOD today is closely aligned with those of Tenor. You only need to realize that of the seven BOD members, two are Tenor directors, who with Fung and Oppenheimer control the BOD (4 out of 7 directors).

Fung and Oppenheimer have, by act or omission, compromised their fiduciary duty to the shareholders the moment they accepted to be compensated by Tenor for their share of the NAP as the Management Incentive Plan, which was diminished cuncurrently with the dilution of the shareholder's NAP share. Fung and Oppenheimer stand to receive tens of millions of dollars from Tenor through their agreement. BOD members have been and will be set aside for such an obvious conflict of interest risk.  

The third order of business is to have an independent person or entity (e.g. retired Supreme Court Judge) review the bankruptcy proceedings form start to finish to expose and assign responsibilities for the harm inflicted to the shareholders. The first thing to look into is who proposed and agreed to the dilution of the shareholders original 35% share of the NAP in Tenor's favor after having predicated the approval of the Tenor DIP financing. The second thing to look into needs to be the fact that Tenor and the Monitor committed to allow the Shareholders to participate in the DIP financing process and then renege on it.