I agree with most of what you say. 

First, since it links to my proposal, you suggest that PTSC no longer provide any specific incentives to S&L to get then to convert warrants (or, I assume, to adopt my proposed Agreement).  I totally agree.  If the desired act will benefit them, THAT is the incentive.  Cutting all ties?  IMO, this is virtually impossible until their share count decreases to less than 5% of OS.

Executive compensation/bonuses/perks - I agree again.  Their's is not a "regular job".  PTSC employees should receive a reasonable salary (and it should be noted that in SD, "reasonable" to enable a normal lifestyle is way out of whack with most of the rest of the world).  Beyond that (i.e., bonuses/perks), there should be a direct tie to performance.  Selecting the metric is difficult, however.  Revenues?  PPS?  May purely be the result of efforts by TPL/Alliacense.  PPS is probably best of what's available, and it's "tangible".

As far as investments in other companies (shareholder vote), IMO, that's a tough one.  But I believe they could easily establish a policy (as most companies do) with paramaters such that they must gain shareholder approval dependent on the risk of the endeavor.  This is usually measured in terms of dollars (e.g., investments valued over $X, or multiple investments in a period of time having an agregate value greater than $Y, require approval by a majority of shareholders).  That could work.  But I don't think we want to tie their hands when a low risk, low dollar, opportunity comes along (IMO, like Holocom).  A commitee established to assess risk might be good, but hope do you compensate THEM?  IMO, the commitee job is what the BoD is for.  Get the right people on the BoD.  And that in itself is problematic.  For that matter, we must have the "correct" CEO.

Thank you for your thoughts and ideas.  The planned Letter certainly has prompted deeper thought!

SGE