From,

The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to allow Higgins to testify, on the ground that any testimony adverse to Moore would violate Higgins's fiduciary duty to Moore, and because the court found that Moore had validly asserted the attorney-client privilege to prevent Higgins from testifying.

to,

The appellants do not dispute the historical facts of this case, but argue instead that Higgins's conduct was permissible. Under Ninth Circuit law, we review that issue de novo, United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1993), and if we sustain the district court's conclusion that an ethical violation occurred, we review the court's choice of sanction for an abuse of discretion. Golden Eagle Distrib.

Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986).

A Rule 3-310 (E) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct states that "[a]

member shall not, without the informed written consent of the client or former client, accept employment adverse to the client or former client where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, the member has obtained confidential information material to the employment." The appellants do not dispute that Higgins's employment as a consultant to Patriot in its suit against Moore was "employment adverse to" Moore, or that Higgins's conduct otherwise fell within the scope of what the rule prohibits. Under California law, it does not matter that Higgins was acting as a litigation consultant, rather than Patriot's attorney. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hamilton, 96 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1039 (Cal. App. 2002).

then,

In this case, because there was no such consent we uphold the district court's conclusion that Higgins violated Rule 3-310 (E) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, and that Beatie & Osborn violated Rule 1-120 by assisting Higgins in doing so.

(Apologies for the delay but I had a pressing matter to attend, which couldn't wait)

Be well