While I admit I have not "caught up" on all posts since the above subject item was introduced, I have read enough to recognize that, IMO, it is being mis-interpretted.

Look to the PDS Management Committee resolutions.

The first item, (i), is a welcome resolution in that it does appear to give PTSC (via its representation on the committee) more of a voice in approving future licenses/license fees and prevents, to a degree, TPL's ability to approve future deals unilaterally.

However, the second item (ii) does not "do" what many here are apparently led to believe IMO. It does not prevent TPL/Alliacense from "bundling" non-MMP patent portfolios in their marketing efforts of the MMP. Quite the contrary. What it does do is prevent TPL/Alliacense from marketing other of the patent portfolios they represent without including the MMP as part of the package. In other words, TPL/Alliacense cannot market any of the other patent portfolios at all UNLESS it is part of a bundle with the MMP.

"TPL must not market patent portfolios in which PDS does not have an interest with the MMP Patent Portfolio." The way I interpret this, to have it make any sense, is that a bundle of the MMP and other patents constitutes a larger "patent portfolio" consisting of the MMP PLUS OTHER. If this were not the intended interpretation/intent of this sentence, IMO it would simply say "TPL must only market the MMP". So what this is saying is that IF TPL wishes to license any of the other patent portfolios it represents, it MUST BE BUNDLED WITH AN MMP LICENSE.

Reinforcing this is the understanding/expectation that TPL/Alliacense has in place an MA like ours with each of the owners of other patent portfolios they represent. We, PTSC or the PDS Management Committee, could not direct TPL/Alliacense to violate the terms of all those other MAs with the other patent owners. If such were done/the intent, those other patent portfolio owners could rightfully declare their MAs with TPL/Alliacense as in default, as TPL/Alliacense could not fully live up their obligations. This would definitely harm TPL and, indirectly, probably PTSC as well.

This interpretation of mine also answers the question "why now?" and/or "why did PTSC wait so long", and perhaps the question of how these resolutions ever got passed by the PDS Management Committee. IMO, the timing has to do with the secured PTSC loan to TPL which was secured by future revenues of the MMP. So what this is about is TPL's/Alliacense's dedication of resourses. It's like saying "as long as you owe us money, direct resources to efforts towards recovering that money". After all, how would it "be" if TPL/Alliacense started making a bunch of licensing agreements on other patent portfolios excluding the MMP, thereby collecting money which they would not be obligated to use to pay back our loan?

Note the inclusion of discussion of that loan at the end of the PR. It is there for a reason. It is IMO the fundamental basis of the full complaint and the resolution in question. I strongly suspect that the actual complaint has to do with TPL's failure to demonstrate "acquiescence" to the resolution properly approved by the committee.

There is a potential problem with this whole scenario. That is the other patent portfolio owners. As of this resolution, when enforced, all other patent portfolio owners are "second class citizens". Their portfolio can not be marketed independently, but only as part of a bundle with the MMP. They may have some objection to that.

So that's how I read this and why. And, in common with those who may have adopted a different interpretation, it IMO is "all good" for PTSC and does demonstrate backbone.

JMHOs,

SGE