"That's like saying they are agreeing that the licensee infringes only if whatever financing you are talking about goes through."

No. It's like the infringing company saying, we infringe but we can only afford to pay $X even though you want $Y. We want to license for $X but if you insist on $Y, we'll need more money as we don't have it to give to you or if we did, it would bankrupt us. However, if you'll take $X now for the license, we'll agree to pay $Y-$X after we do our IPO or PIPE or get some other financing. Otherwise we do $X or we do no deal at all.

"Which is why the implication from your post is that you think the issuance of stock is generating revenues."

Your inference may have been what you state, but my implication was nothing of the sort. I simply used "revenues" as a synonym for "funds" or "money" or "cash". Apparently, you missed that explanation in the last post.

Perhaps you're correct that most licensors wouldn't cut such a deal the way you describe and would instead use a note or some other means to secure the funding. At the same time, there are a lot of things related to the MMP and to PTSC that have caused many to stop and scratch their heads, lol. Most licensors may be in better financial positions, or have cleaner patent ownership relationships than PDS, be less desperate, and be able to dictate terms as you describe. Who knows. Read some of the emails and memos associated with the Apple license signing and see if you think we've got a "typical" license team, lol.

Mine was simply an example of the many "contingent" possibilities that would be more likely and more defineable than paying significant legal bills to control and get to a resolution of a case, that you then leave open to future events to which you no longer have control or involvement.

The problem with the "contingent on the Markman Ruling scenario" or some other legal process, as we've learned from the process so far, is that unless on a wholesale basis, the "contingent outcomes" were limited to the MMP team being "able to proceed with infringement allegations" or "unable to proceed with infringement allegations" (as PTSC characterized the results in their 10q), then how would one define the "one way" or the "another way" that you describe.

We've learned ourselves through the process that even when the parties submit their own preferred constructions, the judge is free to choose either, parts of each, or inject his own. Even when the typical precedent is that the judge only consider intrinsic evidence, he may choose to consider extrinsic evidence as well. Even when one term is constructed one way, it may in effect undermine the way another term was constructed. Essentially, there aren't really any true "either / or" scenarios but rather "either / or / or /or /or, etc" scenarios.