So let me get this straight, we should charge a company that makes $100M per year in revenue $4M and a company that makes $1B per year in revenue $4M, and of course, perhaps charge the $10B per year company more, but focus on getting the nuisance value out of all of these 400-800 notified targets that don'f fall into the "charge more" category you state?!

I think that's a ridiculous strategy. I think by doing so, you continue to delegitimize the MMP licensing program, just as we have done by sending demand letters of preposterous amounts like over $1B and then turning around and offering settlements of pennies on that dollar when it comes down to real negotiations, and ultimately settling for a fraction on that settlement offer. We've appropriately been laughed out of the room and marginalized, despite having a legitimate, valid and strong patent portfolio that these companies NEED to license to be legitimate themselves.

I know in part your post is intended to diminish PTSC and TPL and the MMP, but besides pointing out the ridiculousness of your approach, I'd like to highlight what I think is a proper approach. Once we know we're in the clear with the NDoC verdict, meaning no appeals and HTC actually fully licensed, and that certainty in the Federal Court provides the ITC with the meat to overturn the ID and find for infringement for most or all of the remaining 8, we should PUBLICIZE a structured pricing schedule per market segment. For example .125% for handset makers, $0.009 / unit for chips, maybe .05% for Automakers, etc. We can escalate those costs up in tiers for resistant licensees to cover the additional licensing costs and to increase court settlement amounts if it has to go that far, etc., but the point is to stop playing the "secrecy" game under the guise that we'll get more from those future companies if they dont' know what others paid. History shows that as false, for starters, but more importantly, it's a "neighborhood wise-guy shake down" philosophy the undermines, rather than supports our efforts, not to mention invites and allows corporate malfeasance on the part of our partner, and even our own company. Sure we might get a few companies to pay more, but ultimately, as we saw in the ITC case, it just makes us look bad and undermines our case.

There are plenty of licensing models out there, I'm sure, and while we still have a little ways to go (clear NDoC and ITC with positive / no-turning-back results), I'm hoping once we get there, that we'll see something like that. If Leckrone is unable to agree to such a thing, and perhaps even if he will, having a new front man/licensing representative would be a great way to mark this change in approach.