"If China’s brightest entrepreneurs do not feel safe in Xi’s revisionist Party state, why do so many in the West cling to the belief that China is serious about restoring mutually beneficial foreign trade relations? In fact, Xi  has no wish to revive a steady state in any aspect of relations with the West. He now seeks only to engage with foreign financial and commercial partnerships that serve to advance his military and political agenda, which is directly opposed to Western interests. Crucially, China’s massive trade surpluses are now used chiefly to intensify conflict and competition."

This quote comes from an article in The Telegraph and is linked below:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/china-s-war-on-the-western-economy-will-be-devastating/ar-AA1qOSYK?ocid=hpmsn&cvid=1057f43309cc49cfb57b5654711055e5&ei=83

"Chinese billionaires are leaving China because Xi Jinping’s policies make it intolerable for them. His visceral mistrust, persecution and disruption of successful entrepreneurs; failure to address key causes of economic stagnation and decline, most notably the distorted property market; increasingly fraught relations with major foreign trading partners and worries about future tariffs and sanctions linked to the Ukraine/Taiwan nexus – all add up to a powerful incentive to get out fast."

FBI Director, Christopher A. Wray, before the Select Committee ofCongress on 31 January 2024: 

"The PRC cyber threat is made vastly more dangerous by the way they knit cyber into a whole-of-government campaign against us. They recruit human sources to target our businesses, using insiders to steal the same kinds of innovation and data their hackers are targeting while also engaging in corporate deception—hiding Beijing’s hand in transactions, joint ventures, and investments—to do the same."

https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/director-wrays-opening-statement-to-the-house-select-committee-on-the-chinese-communist-party

“There is no such thing as a ‘private company’ in China,” Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), said during his opening statement at a hearing focused on the risks to American companies operating in China."

"In other words, Mr. Gallagher said that “every foreign business that enters China takes on a sometimes silent, sometimes not-so-silent business partner: the Chinese Communist Party.”

In recent months, Beijing began putting pressure on foreign auditing, consulting, and due diligence firms, including raids on three U.S. firms: Bain & Co., Capvision, and Mintz Group. The raids, according to Mr. Gallagher, clearly show that the CCP “considers sunlight and accurate business information in the hands of foreign companies operating in the PRC [People’s Republic of China] to be threats to its continued rule.”

“It’s time for American corporate executives to take off the golden blindfolds and stare with clear eyes at the growing peril of doing business in China,” Mr. Gallagher said.

https://www.ntd.com/every-foreign-company-in-china-accepts-ccp-as-business-partner-rep-gallagher_931121.html

"Recent trends in China’s shift towards a technology-focused and high value-added economy have prompted new industrial policy overhauls, namely that of Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025), a plan aiming to achieve self-sufficiency and independence in 10 key industries where the country currently lacks expertise and authority."

"Among the plan’s most effective and contentious strategy, forced technology transfers (FTTs) have allowed Chinese enterprises to access foreign expertise and intellectual property through the forced transfer of critical data and information from international companies, offering one of the largest consumer markets in the world in return – a tough cost to bear for many firms seeking to safeguard their technology. Facing heavy condemnation from the global community, China sees forced transfers as an integral step in carrying out MIC 2025, and has continued to borrow classified company data in hopes of achieving beneficial outcomes in both domestic and international markets."

" Forced transfer agreements allow China to require foreign companies to transfer important data and expertise to Chinese companies as part of joint ventures, all without violating commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO). As Brad W. Setser of the Council of Foreign Relations puts it, China’s joint venture rules rake in outside technologies ranging from high-speed rail to electric vehicle batteries. The key in this tactic is “linking inward investment in China to technology transfer to Chinese firms.” This, of course, does wonders for Chinese firms that have lagging expertise in fields currently dominated by international firms, such as Japan’s Kawasaki in high-speed rail. Despite the WTO’s mandate barring China from requiring foreign investors to transfer important technology, the country has significant leeway in determining which sectors are open to foreign investment and which sectors aren’t, and it can “condition approval of inward investment on forming a joint venture (JV partner).”

The 3 paragraph quotes directly above come from an article linked below from the Vanderbilt Business Review.com:

https://vanderbiltbusinessreview.com/chinas-forced-technology-transfer-policy-takeaways-for-the-developing-world

Full disclosure:  the Vanderbilt Business Review goes on to suggest there may be a positive side to Forced Technology Transfers.  "Outside of the benefits to the development of indigenous capabilities within the country, forced technology transfers may actually be “a pretty good idea”, according to Jeff Spross of The Week in his op-ed “China’s forced technology transfer is actually a pretty good idea.”   I disagree with Spross's conclusions as it affects the foreign partner in the JV, but that should be obvious as it relates to POET in its JV in my opinion.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies in November, 2023 published an article that included, among other things, 4 assumptions about doing business with China:

"Assumptions about China

A discussion of the technology relationship with China should begin with four assumptions. First, China will remain a competitor for the foreseeable future and will ignore international norms for commerce, espionage, and sovereignty when it finds them inconvenient. China is not going to end its efforts to reshape the global order (by which it means a world ordered by the Chinese Communist Party). China’s nonmarket policies and predatory commercial practices distort the global economy and create strategic risk to Western nations.

Second, the West cannot “decouple” from China, nor can China decouple from the West. The global economy is too interconnected for Cold War-style bifurcation. Decoupling is not achievable, even though China itself wants to decouple. While China remains reliant on Western technology, markets, and finance, significant dependencies have developed between Western companies and Chinese suppliers and markets.

Third, China will make progress in developing technology irrespective of Western constraints. At best, the West can slow this progress. Some of China’s progress will be the result of espionage and intellectual property (IP) theft by China, to which the West needs to respond more forcefully, but it also reflects China’s significant investments in technology and science. A reliance on export chokepoints offers limited prospects for success in a contest that will last years, if not decades.

Finally, global distrust in China, its intentions, and its technology, will continue to grow, although this distrust is not yet sufficient in many countries to counter Chinese influence and incentives. China as a supplier is more dangerous than China as a customer. Distrust does not ensure support for Western policies, but it will frustrate China’s efforts to build a Sino-centric world order.

If these assumptions are correct, they point to the need to seek to change China’s behavior while defending against predatory practices that include mercantilist policies that favor Chinese companies, unacceptable state-backed lending practices, illicit subsides, and industrial espionage. Against these practices, technology transfer restrictions such as export controls are insufficient unless embedded in a comprehensive diplomatic program to set expectations for China and to penalize depredation until China can be persuaded to change.

The categories of irresponsible behavior for which China needs to be held accountable are its illicit support for Chinese companies, the obstacles it has imposed on foreign companies operating in China, and its rampant practice of commercial espionage. There are numerous examples in all three categories of behavior, often used in combination, over the last 20 years. Changing these behaviors requires a significant change to Chinese economic policy that will be difficult to attain, but without change, technology and trade with China will continue to harm Western interests.

The acquisition of technology using illicit or coercive techniques, such as requiring joint ventures or the forced transfer of IP, has been part of doing business in China since the early 1980s. Foreign direct investment and joint ventures—which are often coerced—are a leading source of technology transfers. China also takes advantage of Western patent systems, where patents are published, to gain access to technologies. China similarly uses investments in Western countries to gain access to technology. The many techniques used for the illicit acquisition of technology are indicative of China’s larger disregard for international norms and law."

The above information about the 4 assumptions and the comments immediately following those assumptions comes from an article in that November, 2023 article from CSIS: