The theoretical model can be summarised as follows. A monetary expansion temporarily lowers the real interest rate (whether via a fall in the nominal interest rate, a rise in expected inflation, or both ? as now). Real commodity prices rise. How far? Until commodities are widely considered ?overvalued? ? so overvalued that there is an expectation of future depreciation (together with the other costs of carrying inventories: storage costs plus any risk premium) that is sufficient to offset the lower interest rate (and other advantages of holding inventories, namely the ?convenience yield?). Only then do firms feel they have high enough inventories despite the low carrying cost. In the long run, the general price level adjusts to the change in the money supply. As a result, the real money supply, real interest rate, and real commodity price eventually return to where they were. The theory is the same as Rudiger
Dornbusch?s famous theory of exchange rate overshooting, with the price of commodities
substituted for the price of foreign exchange.
There was already some empirical evidence to
support the theory: Monetary policy
news and
real interest rates, along with other factors, do appear to be significant determinants of real commodity prices historically.
But the events since August 2007 provide a further data point. As economic growth has slowed sharply, both in the US and globally, the Fed has reduced interest rates, both nominal and real. Firms and investors have responded by shifting into commodities, not out. This is why commodity prices have resumed their upward march over the last six months, rather than reversing it.