the Google IPR, and we (me anyway) have formed a view point. That utilizing current patented prior art as the subject matter to argue a petition....the petitioner had better make sure they are aligned with the owner of the prior art in some form. Because, they are going to gold seal the out come of an IPR in either direction on conclusion.

Whatever one feels of that....the next obstacle is.....

iBaby and its contentions of case procedure.

"In federal court, a pleading must contain a short, plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint is deficient if it fails to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)."

Dissected: What the judge will weigh for the most part...

"In federal court, a pleading must contain a short, plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

A complaint is deficient if it fails to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)."

LINK

“Holding "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level"; further holding, to state a claim of conspiracy, plaintiff must allege "enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement"

"The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit, which had reversed the decision of the District Court (Lynch D.J.) dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."

"The Court then upheld the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, holding that the mere allegations contained in the complaint that the competitors had agreed not to compete were insufficient to state a claim of under the Sherman Act. The Court found that Twombly's complaint had not provided enough facts for the court to find it plausible that the companies had engaged in a conspiracy; instead, the complaint provided factual bases for parallel conduct—not enough under the Court's new interpretation of the Sherman Act—and merely stated that an agreement had taken place, with no details to support that allegation. The Court held that the dismissal of the complaint was therefore proper."

If "Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)" is now found to be deficient in light of the above, then Handal will have to come up with a boiler plate complaint, if possible, that is satisfactory in front of and without discovery.

Will the judge Tiger consider that the context is different than noted above? It would just move to appeal if he does...

In any event, is this enough to put off future litigation endeavors?

FWIW

doni