ROBERTO GIUSTI
EL UNIVERSAL

Hugo Chávez's rhetoric, emotional, crony-oriented, ideological and political arsenal deployed over the last ten years to further, consolidate or simply keep afloat his project, has become as trite as his own image.

Polls, systematically revealing an almost legendary invincibility, now evidence a seemingly fallen myth.

Lost faith
At first glance, the answers are simple. Chavez's downfall began in the third quarter of 2007, caused mainly by two events: the shutting down of television station Radio Caracas Televisión and the launching of a constitutional reform aimed at expanding his political and institutional power and making his term in office indefinite.

In addition to these two events -which Chávez felt he was entitled to after his resounding victory in the presidential vote held in December 2006-, other factors progressively shattered people's blind faith in him. Growing skepticism emerged in response to the government's failure to address issues such as crime, food shortage, inflation, corruption, poor healthcare services, and unemployment.

In just six months, Chávez's world crumbled, and what should have been a sprint to the finish in a long race toward absolute power, not only over the state but also over society as a whole, resulted in an electoral defeat on December 2, 2007.

Empty handed
Then something that Chávez was trying to avoid took place: instead of grasping the underlying causes of his defeat and making amends, as he did after previous setbacks, he fell victim to arrogance and acted as if he had actually come out victorious in the referendum. Large billboards showing that infamous phrase from his failed coup attempt in 1992 -"For Now"- were posted throughout the country. But that warning, capable of unleashing a storm in the past, sounded weary, vague and boastful and lacked social or political support.

His project rejected by the population, Chávez resorted to old arguments, predictable responses and weary stances, which have brought about catastrophic results. Contempt and mistrust are greater now than in December, and nothing seems to be likely to reverse this trend in the near future.

Venezuelans are simply making it clear that they oppose to his vision of the country and society as a whole, as well as his inexcusable thirst for power and his appalling administration. Stunned by the loss of his proposal, empty handed and incapable of creating a political lifeline to support him until 2013, Chávez continues to err and sink deeper, thus progressively losing the original source of his power: people's support. Without the latter he is lost, and yet he knowingly fails to waiver his stance. In doing so, he shuts down the country's options as well as his own.

Sole culprit
After ten years of a militarized, centralized and personalist government, where the caudillo knows all and is all lord and master of bodies and souls (in government, the armed forces, his own party, public powers, regional governments and so forth) the population holds him accountable for all the hardships endured. In other words, Chávez is the sole culprit. In the public's opinion, he is the only one liable for soaring homicide rates in Caracas and even uncollected waste and rubbish piling up in the poorest areas of the country.

It was no coincidence that Chávez turned his electoral project in 2007 into a personal campaign, believing that just his name or presence would round up mass support and all previous offenses and disappointments would be forgotten. But the exact opposite took place. Now, with upcoming elections for mayors and governors, candidates no longer see him as the perennial launching pad blasting them into victory by simply raising their hands up high for all to see; they feel that an association with Chávez could actually spell defeat for them, as evidenced by recent polls.

Against all odds
Chávez, however, still has a significant tool: power and his opportunistic way to use power. In spite of the social missions which helped him rebound in 2003-2004 based on massive spending and immediate yet partial solutions to basic concerns (health, food, scholarships), the outlook is not so bright this time around. Even though oil revenues continue to surge, greater obligations exist, and the thin ice on which he built up his huge scaffolding to gain electoral support seems to be cracking as a result of the same issues affecting his government: corruption, ineffectiveness and sectarianism in distribution of assets, goods and benefits.

Since his defeat at the ballots on December 2nd, Chávez has failed to renew his strategies, revise his stance or adapt his course of action in response to the desires of the population; no changes in either the message or messenger can be expected. The song remains the same, but it is increasingly out of tune. A well-oiled political machine whose leader used to excite and galvanize the masses has become a feeble caricature rifted by all sorts of selfish interests, while the leader's orders are being increasingly and more openly disregarded.

This government is visibly falling apart, and its personalist and caudillo nature shuts the door on all possibilities of political change. In a multiparty system like the one in effect until 1999, alternation in power was guaranteed and took place without major issues and, even at its worst, institutional processes allowed for a peaceful transition (regardless of the coup attempt in 1992) to a different type of political system.

The current perspectives are not so propitious. Even if regional elections bring about changes in the political map of the country and bury Chávez's plans to impose his project, having to coexist with regional leaders and governors of the opposition (according to current polls) or not fully in line with his policies will force Chávez to renounce to his centralist vision and seek consensus as the only means for effective and civilized joint government.

Will Chávez pursue those efforts if he is defeated at the ballots once again? He does not seem willing to do so. In this scenario, what can we expect over the next four years of his term? Many possibilities arise, each increasingly worse than the other.

Translated by Félix Rojas