Hello Luker.

Thanks, again, for your real helpfulness, looking this up for us, as you so often do. Also, I much appreciate, as usual, your intelligent and very well considered choice of this key subject matter, which has important ramifications on many levels. Even though I’m replying at length, still, I’m only beginning to scratch the surface.

Understandably, you’re puzzled with how Fancamp gets away with its untimely disclosure of material events. I believe my own direct experiences explain why this—repeatedly without any repercussions—is the case.

On two separate occasions, nearly three years ago, I queried both the Quebec and the British Columbia Security Commissions concerning (in general and specifically) what was tolerable and what was intolerable, in regards to the disclosure of material events. The answers I received were not very informative and were expressed (by four different office-holders) in the most offhanded and unconcerned tones-of-voices.

Dr. Smith does not live in a vacuum, nor does the Board of Directors, nor do our Geologists, (nor do any of us, for that matter). When Insiders, pretty much, know compliance is rarely enforced (and there are no penalties when it is), it’s futile, pretty much, for Shareholders or anybody else to expect compliance to result.

There are people with governmental positions in Quebec and British Columbia who, no doubt, sit in comfortable well-padded chairs, behind impressive-looking desks. On top of each of those desks is a nameplate. Beneath the engraved name is also, engraved, the corresponding prestigious job title of the person who confidently sits behind the desk.

There’s only one incongruity in this comfy picture. The people (four in this case) haven’t a clue as to how to live up to their engraved-on-their-nameplates prestigious job titles. They received no instructions (or not enough instructions) nor, anyway, do they have the inclinations to put themselves out nor, anyway, is it expected of them. That (and not more) is the dedication and diligence Dr. Smith is up against. That’s the real-world bureaucratic environment Dr. Smith contends with and (so far as I can tell) gets along with very well (for 25 years).

You live and learn. Going back to the experiences I mentioned I had: After I spoke to the-powers-that-be, in the end, I wound up at the same place I started (but the wiser for it). In other words, even when an outsider Good Samaritan reports violations (or questionable practices) that the regulatory authorities should have picked up on their own, in the end, it goes for nothing. In my case, I was referred to an impressive number of pages of regulatory text (on the internet), which spelled out the regulatory responsibilities and the courses of action that the regulators previously were required to follow.

The only problem was that approximately eighty to ninety percent of the text was, literally, crossed-out (but still visible beneath the lines going through it)! Apparently—by asking a few innocent questions—what I had uncovered was the documentary fallout of what happens just before the finalization of some kind of politically-inspired deregulation schemata.

I suspected I had witnessed the documentary proof that the authorities were in the process of unwinding most of what they had previously been charged to do, to protect the investing public. What I had seen with my own eyes was reinforced by what I was told (in no uncertain terms), namely, that the office-holders’ job requirements (the updated new ones) consist of little more than making sure publically-listed companies properly file the required forms and paperwork, in the proper fashion, on time.

So far as corrective actions, I was told (in no uncertain terms) that those were up to me, not them. So far as violations, inimical to the Shareholders, it was explained to me (at length) that I only had two remedies, both of which entirely depended on my own voluntary willingness to assume the regulatory responsibilities for myself: A) I could hire an attorney for the purpose of taking direct legal action against any or all wrongdoers that I could identify on my own. B) Alternatively, I was advised, I had the option of organizing a shareholder revolt to remove the board of directors and replace them with my own candidates.

I guess that’s how deregulation works in Canada. In the USA, it’s ten times worse; because blatantly ripping-off shareholders is perfectly legal, so long as the Insiders disclose (in detail) how they are going to do it, in the company’s annual proxy statements.

In the USA, it’s only dinnertime as usual, when the Insiders schedule a banquet for themselves to the extreme detriment of the Shareholders. Even after the Insiders have consumed a sumptuous feast and the Shareholders are left to go hungry—even after the consumption is ten times greedier than what deeply troubles the Canadians who contribute to this Message Hub—that raiding of the pantry passes without comment in the USA because it’s so prevalent there (where I live).