FOR THOSE OF YOU THAT ARE UNHAPPY TODAY PLEAS E
in response to
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posted on
May 16, 2008 06:29PM
is, ironically, procedural rather
than substantive. By this I mean that thetiming of such a hearing is critically
important to many patent litigators.
Many defendants urge that the hearing
be conducted early in a case, and withoutany discovery. Their strategy is to
keep the plaintiff in a discovery “black
hole,” and get a claim interpretation
that will set up a summary judgment
motion for non-infringement or invalidity,
leading to a quick exit from the case.
On the other hand, plaintiffs often,
though not always, want discovery andtherefore are usually not eager for early
Markman hearings. A summary judgment
motion following a Markman ruling that
precedes discovery is difficult to oppose.
Most courts have decided that a summary
judgment motion granted without providing
the non-moving party an opportunity
for discovery is unfair.What would I do? Call it chickening
out if you like, but I would refuse to
decide the claim construction issue until
I was at the point were I felt more comfortable
with the technology involved. I
have always speculated that one of the
characteristics of the best district judges
is that they know when they have enough
information in order to make a decision,
and then they decide without further
delay or ado. It is an art, and like Irving
Younger’s comment that Joe DiMaggio
played center field as though God created
him to do that and nothing else, it is
much harder than it looks.The Markman hearing in this case was
in the context of summary judgment
motions, as envisioned in the Markman
decision. But the hearing was relatively
early on, and during the discovery period.
It was the judge’s first exposure to the
technical aspect of the case. The summary
judgment motions dealt with contributory
infringement and inducement, as well as
direct infringement.
Two errors resulted. First, the court
interpreted claims based on a restriction
requirement, which as we patent gurus
are supposed to know, is a procedure
intended to make examination more efficient
in the Patent Office. To my knowledge,
there are no other cases that use a
response to a restriction requirement, in
the absence of any rejection, to interpret
the claims and limit them. The most
recent statement I am aware of on this
score is Merck & Co., Inc,. v. MylanPharmaceuticals, Inc., 1999 U.S. App.LEXIS 21395 (Fed. Cir. September 3,
1999), where the restriction requirement
was coupled with a prior art rejection.Second, the defendant’s summary judgment
motion for no direct infringement
was granted, relying in part on the absence
of evidence that later turned up because
discovery was ongoing. The problem
regarding the restriction requirement
flowed directly from the decision to hold
an early Markman hearing. The Court had
not become familiar with the patents or the
file history, and tried to do too much too
soon. Had the Court not decided to hold a
Markman hearing, the summary judgment
motions might well have been deferreduntil discovery was complete and all the
facts were available.
My view is that the claim construction
issues would have been better addressed
in jury instructions, and not before. That
would have given the court the benefit of
hearing testimony, hearing the inventor,
and hearing and seeing the accused products
and processes. The court will likely
have to do it anyway, since the other summary
judgment motions were denied. An
early Markman hearing did not contribute
to, or increase the likelihood of, a correct
decision. In fact, it detracted from it.
As I said earlier, take my words with a
grain, or even two, of salt. But anecdotal
evidence is still evidence, and these
experiences give us at least a glimpse of
how well Markman hearings work in real
life, and whether they produce the benefits
that were envisioned. These two
Markman hearings increased expense.
One of them led to erroneous rulings.
Both posed a considerable burden on the
decision-maker, and enhanced the risk of
error. Early Markman hearings simply
aren’t worth it.